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1. Introduction
There are many ways for countries to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). It is 
extremely important to create a favorable business environment and to provide 
multinational firms with pecuniary incentives (e.g., tax breaks and grants). However, 
activities by investment promotion agencies (IPAs), which are established in almost all 
countries, are equally important at least in the short term. This is because, in many 
cases, potential foreign investors do not have enough information about the countries 
where they are considering investing, and IPAs can bridge this gap between investors 
and countries.
For instance, Ireland’s Industrial Development Authority (IDA) declares on their 
website that their country is one of the best places to do business.1 When the IDA 
started attracting FDI in the 1970s, Ireland was less developed than many Western 
European countries. The IDA had to use the strategy of inviting firms by compensating 
them for locating in such a “backward” country. After that, partly due to the improved 
labor quality as a result of heavy investment in education, Ireland underwent 
significant economic development. The IDA then felt a need for an advertising 
program to correct the misperceptions of investors and create a new image of Ireland 
as source of high-quality labor. The IDA engaged in promotion campaigns built on the 
increased skills of the Irish labor force (Wells and Wint, 2000).
Wells and Wint (2000, p. 4) define investment promotion as “activities that 
disseminate information about, or attempt to create an image of the investment site and 
provide investment services for the prospective investor.” The focus of this paper is on 
the first role: disseminating information. Through this function, IPAs can communicate 
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all the features that make their country attractive as FDI recipients.
FDI promotion can be a costly activity because it is not confined to creating a 
website. Even if jobs related only to information dissemination are considered, tasks 
include holding investment forums and seminars, sending direct mail, and engaging in 
delegate investment missions.
To analyze such IPA campaigns, we apply costly signaling models from game 
theory. Our analytical focus is on a rather short-term event, and we treat the business 
environment as given. It is assumed that the attractiveness of a country is not well-
known to foreign investors and that the IPA for this country has an opportunity to 
signal the attractiveness through their advertising campaigns.
Inspired by the above anecdote about Ireland, the unknown parameter of 
attractiveness is taken to be labor quality in this study.2 The purpose of this paper is to 
provide a theoretical rationale for IPA campaigns. Specifically, we are interested in 
determinants of the campaign intensity: how the intensity is related to the actual labor 
quality, and how changes in exogenous factors such as the market demands in this 
industry affect the intensity.
There are some empirical studies that explore the activities of IPAs. Among such 
studies, Morisset and Andrews-Johnson (2004) argue that FDI promotion is in general 
effective by showing that FDI attraction and the average expenditure of IPAs are 
positively associated. Harding and Javorcik (2011) report that investment promotion 
works in countries where information asymmetries are likely to be severe.
Theoretical papers have traditionally focused on the use of corporate taxes or 
subsidies as means of FDI attraction. For instance, there are several papers that analyze 
tax competition for internationally mobile firms in models of economic geography 
(e.g., Borck and Pflüger, 2006). In addition, several papers, including Bjorvatn and 
Eckel (2006), investigate subsidy competitions in a monopolistic setting, whereas 
Haufler and Wooton (2010) analyze tax competitions in an oligopolistic industry.
This paper also adds to the literature on signaling behavior in international trade. 
Collie and Hviid (1993, 1994, 1999) analyze how trade policies can be distorted when 
domestic governments intend to signal some information about their countries through 
the policies. Bond and Samuelson (1986) show that governments may use tax holidays 
to signal their countries’ productivity levels and attract FDI. In contrast, there are some 
models in which firms rather than governments send signals about unknown 
parameters (e.g., Wright, 1998; Kolev and Prusa, 2002; Miyagiwa and Ohno, 2007; 
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Cassing and To, 2008; Katayama and Miyagiwa, 2009). To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, this study and Sawaki (2015) are the first attempts to investigate IPA 
advertising campaigns using signaling models.
2. The model
We consider a model of FDI attraction under incomplete information. The 
oligopolistic setup in Haufler and Wooton (2010) is used as the basis of the model, 
because this setup is compatible with incomplete information.
Suppose that there are two countries, a and b, in either of which a fixed number of 
multinational firms are ready to make investments. After the investment stage, these 
firms are supposed to compete in homogenous-good markets. It is assumed that each 
firm’s marginal cost of production reflects the labor quality of the country in which the 
firm has chosen its investment site. Thus, the labor quality in each country is important 
information for firms when making decisions about FDI. Suppose, however, that the 
true labor quality of country a is not known to any firm at the beginning of the game. 
The IPA for country a knows the true quality and has the opportunity to engage in 
advertising campaigns to signal this. We assume one-sidedness of incomplete 
information, in part for tractability and in part because we want to see how an IPA 
engages in such campaigns when confronted with a country with established 
reputations. Therefore, the true labor quality of country b is common knowledge. The 
main players in this model are the IPA of country a and the multinational firms.
The total population in this area is normalized to unity. For tractability, the 
populations in the two countries are assumed to be identical: each country has 1 /2 
consumers. A simple partial-equilibrium model of a good, labeled x, is considered. 
Each consumer in the two countries has the identical inverse demand  pi = a – x , 
where  xi  is the per-capita consumption in country  i ∈{a, b}  and  pi  is the price of 
this good.3  The aggregate demand in each country is
Xi = (1 /2)(α – pi) ,  i ∈ {a, b}.  (1)
On the supply side, there are a total of k multinational firms, where  k ≥ 2 is an 
integer, based in the third country and ready to invest in country a or country b.
Each firm incurs identical fixed costs when making an investment. It is assumed 
that these costs are sufficiently large that each firm constructs a production facility in 
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only one of the two countries. As in Haufler and Wooton (2010), these costs are 
omitted in the equations below for simplicity.
From its own facility, each firm serves the markets of both countries a and b. xij 
denotes the sales in market i (i.e., the market in country i) by a country-j firm (i.e., a 
firm that has constructed its facility in country j),  i, j ∈ {a, b}. The aggregate supply 
in markets a and b are, respectively,
Xa = ka xaa + kb xab  ; Xb = ka xba + kb xbb  , (2)
where ki is the number of country-i firms ( ka + kb = k ), which is determined 
endogenously in the model. The firms engage in Cournot competition in the two 
segmented markets. Profits for each firm are defined as follows:
πa = ( pa – ω ) xaa + ( pb – ω – τ ) xba  ,
πb = ( pa – τ ) xab + pb xbb  , (3)
where πi represents the profit for a country-i firm. τ ( > 0) is an export cost, which is 
exogenous here as in Haufler and Wooton (2010). ω is the marginal cost of production 
for a country-a firm. The following assumption is made.
Assumption 1. (i) ω is inversely associated with the labor quality in country a.
(ii) The marginal cost for a country-b firm is normalized to zero.
Part (i) above is consistent with Haufler and Wooton (2010). This is because, in 
their model, the marginal cost of production is the product of the wage rate and the 
labor-input coefficient; the former is constant while the latter is the reciprocal of the 
labor productivity in the host country. The normalization in part (ii) reduces the burden 
of calculation and is possible because both the demand and cost functions are linear in 
this model (see Appendix 1). Strictly, ω is interpreted as the difference between 
marginal costs in countries a and b. Incomplete information is introduced in this 
parameter below.
Using (1) and (2), the profits in (3) can be rewritten as
πa = πaa + πba , (4)
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where  πaa ≡ [α – 2(ka xaa + kb xab) – ω]xaa ,  πba ≡ [α – 2(ka xba + kb xbb) – ω – τ]xba;
πb = πab + πbb , (5)
where πab  ≡  [α – 2(ka xaa + kb xab) – τ]xab ,  πbb  ≡  [α – 2(ka xba + kb xbb)]xbb  .  
Technical discussions of the rationale behind Assumption 1 and equations (3) –
(5) are given in Appendix 1.
It is assumed that ω∈[ωmin , ωmax] is a random variable picked by Nature, and its 
true value is initially private information only known to the IPA of country a. No firm 
knows the true value before the investment stage. Because this model focuses on 
separating equilibrium (as seen below), the distribution of ω need not be specified, 
although it is supposed to have positive density everywhere in the interval [ωmin , ωmax] 
and to be common knowledge. ω
 
> 0  is taken to mean that the labor quality of country 
a is inferior to that of b, and vice-versa. As a first step in investigating FDI promotion, 
we focus for the most part on the situation in which the labor qualities in countries a 
and b are not markedly different:
Assumption 2. (i)  ωmin < 0  < ωmax  .     (ii)  ωmax – ωmin    is not large.
This assumption increases tractability: if ωmax and /or ωmin deviate far from zero, then it 
becomes difficult to determine the signs of some functions and thus to derive general 
conclusions, although simulations are still possible, as seen below.
The IPA of country a signals the value ω to firms via promotion campaigns. Wells 
and Wint (2000, p. 164) argue that, due to the public-good nature of investment 
promotion, IPAs are naturally government-funded. Therefore, in this paper we assume 
that the IPA has the same objective as the government and maximizes the following:
G = (1 /4)(xa)2 – e . (6)
The first term in the RHS is the consumer surplus in country a, calculated using 
n(1 /2)(xa)2, where n = 1 /2 is the population of country a. e is the expenditure on FDI 
promotion, based on which the firms update their beliefs about ω and make their 
investment and production decisions. As seen in (6), other than the concern about the 
expenditure, the objective of the IPA is to maximize the consumer surplus by 
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enhancing competition. This setup is consistent with the objective of governments in 
the main model in Haufler and Wooton (2010).
The timing is as follows. In Stage 0, Nature picks ω∈[ωmin , ωmax]. This is 
observed by the IPA of country a, but not by the multinational firms. In Stage 1, the 
IPA chooses e, which is observed by the firms. Conditional on this observation, the 
firms form their posterior beliefs  about ω. In Stage 2, the firms independently make 
decisions on their investment sites. ka firms construct production facilities in country a 
while  kb (= k – ka)  firms construct facilities in country b. The former firms (i.e., the 
country-a firms) learn the true value of ω while the latter firms (i.e., the country-b 
firms) maintain their beliefs of  and do not learn the true value of ω. In Stage 3, the 
firms compete as Cournot oligopolists in the segmented markets.
This is a signaling model in which the IPA is the Sender and the firms are the 
Receivers. Note, however, that in Stage 3 the country-a firms and country-b firms have 
different amounts of information. The country-a firms come to know the true value of 
ω because they can directly observe it in their production facilities; the country-b firms 
do not have this opportunity and maintain their beliefs of . It is assumed that these 
beliefs of the country-b firms are not updated after the investment stage even on off-
the-equilibrium paths. That is, even if unexpected numbers ka and kb are observed 
(“unexpected” in the sense “not consistent with the observed e ”), this event is taken to 
have occurred as a result of mistakes by some firms and the belief is not updated. This 
assumption is natural because no firm knew the true value of ω at the investment 
stage.4
The solution concept used in this model is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, 
which roughly demands two conditions: (i) all players (i.e., the IPA and the firms) 
maximize their own payoffs given the other players’ strategies and the beliefs; (ii) the 
beliefs are consistent with the IPA’s incentives.
The current model focuses on separating equilibrium in which the IPA spends an 
amount e(ω) in advertising, where e(ω) is a one-to-one function. In such an 
equilibrium, the firms associate each level of observed e with a different ω, and thus 
the posterior belief matches the true marginal cost:   = ω. In short, this implies that 
it is impossible for the IPA to misguide the ex-post perceptions of firms about the labor 
quality. The analysis starts at Stage 3 and proceeds backward.
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3. The production stage
In Stage 3, the numbers of firms ka and kb are treated exogenously. Because the 
two markets are segmented and the cost functions are linear, the analyses of the 
markets can be conducted independently.
First, we consider the Cournot competition in market a. Each country-a firm 
maximizes πaa in (4) with respect to xaa while knowing the true ω. The first-order 
condition yields the following:5
(1 /2)(α – ω) = (ka + 1)xaa + kb xab . (7)
The country-b firms do not know ω and thus have to make an inference about a 
country-a firm’s choice xaa . Each country-b firm takes the expectation of πab in (5) 
conditional on the observed e,
,
and maximizes this with respect to xab. The first-order condition leads to:
. (8)
The country-b firms infer xaa by taking the expectation of (7):6
, (9)
where  is the posterior belief conditional on e. 
It is convenient to derive the relationship between  and xab by subtracting 
(9) from (8):
.  (10)
This equation implies that when = 0 (i.e., when the labor qualities in a and b 
are perceived to be equivalent), the expected local sales by a country-a firm should be 
larger than the exports by a country-b firm owing to the advantage of not incurring 
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export costs. Equations (7), (8), and (10) yield the Bayesian Nash equilibrium outputs 
in Stage 3:
,
. (11)
Then, the per-capita consumption in country a becomes:
. (12)
From (11), it follows that a decline in  decreases x*ab but increases x*aa . That is, 
if country-b firms believe that the labor quality in country a is high (i.e., if  is low), 
then they step back and reduce their outputs. However, country-a firms increase their 
outputs in response to these actions by country-b firms. Because the former effect on 
x*ab dominates the latter on x*aa , a decline in  decreases the overall outputs in country 
a (to be consumed by an individual), as seen in (12), and thus raises the equilibrium 
price  p*a = α – x*a . This result is summarized as follows:
Lemma 1  A decline in  has an output-reducing effect in country a:
.
In this respect, IPA campaigns inducing a low  can harm the welfare of country 
a. Of course, this result is obtained without consideration of the investment stage and 
thus with the tentative assumption that ka and kb are constant.
Substituting (11) into the first terms on the RHS in (4) and (5) yields the profits 
for each firm from sales in market a, as functions of the belief  and the true type ω:7
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, (13)
.
The analysis of market b can be conducted analogously. The sales by each firm 
are
 ,
. (14)
Using (4), (5), and (14), we can derive the profits each firm earns in market b:
, (15)
.
To focus on interior solutions, we require some constraints on the parameters. As 
mentioned above, in separating equilibrium the posterior belief coincides with the true 
marginal cost. From this fact and Assumption 2, it follows that = ω = 0  is contained 
in the interval of our investigation. If = ω = 0, then the number of firms located in 
each of the two countries is equal (ka = kb = k / 2) as seen in the next section. Therefore, 
to ensure that x*ab in (11) and x*ba in (14) are positive when = ω = 0, the following 
assumption is made:
Assumption 3.   α – [(k / 2) + 1] τ > 0.
This is guaranteed if the demand intercept is sufficiently large.8
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4. The investment stage
In Stage 2, the k firms independently make decisions on investment sites. Because 
no firm knows the true value of ω at this point, each firm has to make inferences about 
its profits conditional on the observed e. If a firm constructs a facility in country a, 
then its expected profit is , where the functional 
forms of  and  are given in (13) and (15), respectively. In the above 
expression, the expectations are taken over ω ; the argument  is the belief formed by 
the country-b firms in Stage 3, which appeared in the last section and is assumed to be 
constant here.
Because  is a quadratic rather than linear function of ω,  
is not in general equivalent to (Jensen’s Inequality). However, because this 
model focuses on separating equilibrium and thus the belief  is formed with null 
support ( i .e. , the belief is an exact number with zero variance), 
 holds. Similar arguments apply for . 
Therefore, if a firm chooses country a as its FDI location, then its expected profit is:
.
The expected profit for a firm that chooses country b is
.
Equating the above expected profits leads to the numbers of firms in the locational 
equilibrium:
;  . (16)
Note that k*a (0) = k*b (0) = k / 2. That is, if the labor quality in country a is expected 
to be equivalent to that in country b, then the numbers of the firms located in a and b 
are equal. In addition, the following lemma holds. The proof is given in Appendix 2.
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Lemma 2  A decline in  has a locational effect in favor of country a: 
.
Lemma 2 implies that if the IPA can successfully persuade foreign investors that 
country a has a highly qualified labor force, then it can invite many investors.
To ensure interior solutions, 0 < k*a < k  is assumed, which is satisfied for ≈ 0 
under Assumption 2. Following Haufler and Wooton (2010), k*a and k*b are treated as 
continuous variables rather than integers.9 In addition, all the outputs in (11) and (14), 
with ki replaced by k*i in (16), are assumed to be positive.
5. The campaign stage
In Stage 1, the IPA of country a engages in promotional campaigns. In doing so, it 
chooses e to maximize the objective in (6), with knowledge of the true type ω and the 
belief of , and subject to the constraints in (12) and (16). Specifically, the objective 
is , where CS denotes the consumer surplus:
. (17)
The functional forms of k*a and k*b are as in (16).
Under complete information (i.e., the firms know the true value ω), e would be 
zero because the campaign expenditures would play no role. However, under 
incomplete information as assumed in this paper, expenditure can affect firms’ beliefs 
and actions. This model is interested in how this expenditure depends on the true labor 
quality. To investigate this, the next lemma, which shows the incentives an IPA faces, 
is important. The proof is in Appendix 3.
Lemma 3  The IPA has an incentive to overstate the labor quality of its country (i.e., 
an incentive to induce a low value for ): .
The negative sign in the above derivative is explained as follows. Recalling the 
definition of CS and the fact that k*b = k – k*a , the derivative can be decomposed as
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, (18)
whose exact functional form is given in (A.2) in Appendix 3. For tractability, we 
evaluate the RHS of (18) at ≈ 0 under Assumption 2.
The expression in the square brackets is focused on: (i)  is positive as 
shown in Lemma 1 (the output effect of ); (ii) it can be shown that  is 
positive as long as ω ≈ 0 . That is, the more firms that enter country a, the greater the 
supply for consumers in country a. Multiplied by it, the value of  is negative, 
as seen in Lemma 2 (the locational effect of ).
Because the locational effect dominates the output effect in the setup of the model, 
the IPA has an incentive to overstate its labor quality (i.e., to understate ), as is 
shown rigorously in Appendix 3. In short, if the IPA of country a persuades investors 
that the country has a qualified labor force, then while this may decrease the supply of 
goods from country b in the future, it induces many investors to enter the country now 
and thus increases the consumer surplus.
In separating equilibrium, however, the above incentive for the IPA is correctly 
anticipated by the firms, and thus the IPA cannot deceive them so = ω. The 
equilibrium requires the following two conditions. First, e(ωmax)=0 (the initial-value 
condition) is necessary. This is because when the resulting inflows of FDI and the 
outputs are at the possible lowest levels, the IPA has no reason to engage in 
advertising. Second, the marginal cost for the IPA of slightly exaggerating the labor 
quality has to match the marginal benefits of such exaggeration (the first-order 
condition). Equating these yields the following differential equation:10
, (19)
where the functional form of the RHS is given in (A.2) in Appendix 3. Equation (19) 
can be solved for e(ω) by integrating the RHS with respect to ω, which is a 
conceptually straightforward but tedious task. Without this task, however, Proposition 
1 can be obtained.
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Proposition 1  e(ω) is a decreasing function with e(ωmax)= 0.
Proof. Lemma 3 and the initial-value condition simply prove it.
That is, the RHS of (19) represents the slope of e(ω), which is negative as seen in 
Lemma 3. Proposition 1 implies that the greater labor quality (i.e., the lower the value 
of ω) that a country has, the more intense the advertising campaigns engaged in by the 
IPA are. This result is natural, because countries will tend to emphasize their 
advantages to the foreign investors. The above result also reflects the scenario in 
Ireland, where the IDA started its full-fledged campaigns to advertise labor quality 
after the quality was improved.
In addition, the above result implies that more intense campaigns are associated 
with attracting more FDI. This is because in our model, the true value of ω is revealed 
ex-post to the firms, and thus lower levels of ω attract more firms to country a. This 
implication is consistent with the findings in Morisset and Andrews-Johnson (2004), 
cited in the Introduction.
Instead of showing the explicit solution for e(ω), which is very lengthy, we 
present some simulation results when the parameters are given specific values. The 
solid curve in Figure 1 represents  e(ω)  when α = 10, k = 10, τ =1, ωmin = –0.2, and 
ωmax = 0.2. The proofs of Lemma 3, and thus of Proposition 1, use the fact that this 
curve is downward-sloping at point A as in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Advertising Expenditures
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We next consider the impact of a change in an exogenous variable on the 
expenditure curve:
Corollary 1  An increase in the market demand α shifts the e(ω) curve upward except 
at the point (ωmax, 0).
Proof. The absolute value of , whose functional form is given in (A.3) in 
Appendix 3, is increasing in α. This fact and the initial-value condition prove the 
corollary.
The dashed line in Figure 1 shows the e(ω) curve when α is raised to 12. The 
above proof uses the fact that the slope at point B is steeper than that at point A. Recall 
that , which represents the slope, can be decomposed as in (18). On the RHS, 
x*a indicates how important this industry is to the IPA, while the expression in the 
square brackets indicates the marginal disutility the IPA incurs when its campaign 
efforts fall short of the expected level. Because a rise in α increases the absolute values 
of both parts, as seen in (A.3) in Appendix 3, this magnifies the campaign intensity. 
The impacts of changes in other variables (τ and k) are rather ambiguous.
In this study, we limit our attention to ω ≈ 0 under Assumption 2. Our purpose is 
to derive general results by focusing on tractable parameter intervals rather than to 
emphasize that the main results in Proposition 1 can change when ω deviates far from 
zero. Indeed, although many simulations were conducted, no case in which the slope of 
e(ω) became positive was found while still ensuring interior solutions. In other words, 
in simulations where ω was moved far from zero, some of the interior-solution 
conditions became binding before the sign of the slope changed.
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we analyzed a country’s FDI promotion campaigns through 
signaling its labor quality. It has been shown that, for a tractable range of parameters, 
greater labor quality leads to more intense campaigns. This implies that the intensity of 
campaign efforts and attracting FDI are positively associated. In addition, a rise in 
demand in this industry magnifies the campaign efforts.
In our model, the true labor quality is ex-post revealed to the foreign investors. 
Therefore, whether information is complete or incomplete, neither the number of firms 
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attracted to a country nor the profits for these firms are affected. The only difference 
brought about by incomplete information is found in the welfare for the promoting 
country: incomplete information lowers the welfare due to the cost of advertising 
expenditures. Nonetheless, these costs are indispensable to prevent foreign investors 
from underestimating the labor quality of the country.
An extension of this model is found in Sawaki (2015), in which the market size, 
rather than the labor quality, of a promoting country is supposed to be unknown to 
foreign investors. The market sizes in the two countries are allowed to be different (α 
in country a; β in country b) and the value of α is assumed to be incomplete 
information. It is shown that the greater the value of α, the more intense are the 
campaigns in by the IPA of country a. This result resembles that in the current paper, 
in the sense that countries tend to emphasize their points of excellence. The analysis in 
this extended version is simpler than that in the current paper, one of the reasons being 
that a change in α̂ (i.e., the beliefs about the market size) has output and locational 
effects in the same direction in contrast to the effects in the current paper (Lemmas 1 
and 2).
The analysis in the current study has several limitations. One of them is that the 
main focus has been on the case in which the two countries are rather similar with ω ≈ 
0. Others are that we assumed that the incomplete information is one-sided and the 
demand and cost structures are linear. A more general analysis that overcomes these 
limitations might be a useful subject for future research.
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Appendix 1  Rationale behind Assumption 1 as well as (3)-(5)
Following Haufler and Wooton (2010), the profits for firms are originally defined 
as follows:
πa = ( p'a – ω'a )xaa + ( p'b – ω'a – τ )xba  ,
πb = ( p'a – ω'b – τ )xab + ( p'b – ω'b )xbb  . (A.1)
In the above expressions, ω'i is the marginal cost of production for a country-i 
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firm. In Haufler and Wooton (2010), ω'i ≡ γi ·w, where  γi  is a labor-input coefficient 
and thus a reciprocal for the labor productivity in country i, while w is a wage rate, 
which is equal in the two countries owing to the free-trade condition of the numeraire 
good. The analysis of the numeraire good is completely omitted in the current paper.
The functional forms in (A.1) are identical to those in (4) in Haufler and Wooton 
(2010), except that in their paper γa = γb and thus ω'a = ω'b. In contrast, our model 
allows for a difference in labor productivities in countries a and b. In addition, suppose 
that the intercept of demand is α' rather than α:
p'a = α' – 2(ka xaa + kb xab),    p'b = α' – 2(ka xba + kb xbb).
Based on the above setup, we conduct the following transformation of variables to 
normalize the marginal cost in country b to zero:
α ≡ α' – ω'b ,    ω ≡ ω'a – ω'b.
The profits in (A.1) can then be transformed into those in (3), as well as (4) and 
(5). This normalization is possible because the demand and cost functions are linear, 
and reduces the number of variables, thus simplifying the calculations.
In addition, the above transformation implies that ω = (γa – γb)w. Therefore, ω 
indicates how inferior the labor productivity of country a is compared with that of b, 
leading to part (i) of Assumption 1. In this paper, γb is common knowledge while γa is 
incomplete information, resulting in ω being incomplete information.
Appendix 2  Proof of Lemma 2
We take a derivative of k*a( ) in (16):
.
The case  ≈ 0 is focused on under Assumption 2.
We have , which is negative under Assumption 3. From 
continuity of the function,11 the above derivative is negative for  ≈ 0.
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Appendix 3  Proof of Lemma 3
The derivative of  with respect to  is evaluated at = ω because our 
concern is the IPA’s incentive to manipulate the belief starting from the true state. 
Thus, k*a and k*b in (A.2) below are functions of ω rather than , whose forms are 
given in (16):
.          (A.2)
Assumption 2 is made because it is difficult to determine the sign of the RHS for 
all intervals of the parameters that ensure interior solutions. Thus, we evaluate (A.2) at 
ω = 0. Noting that in this case k*a = k*b = k / 2,
. (A.3)
This is negative under Assumption 3. By continuity of the function, <  0  for 
ω ≈ 0 .
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Notes
1 http://www.idaireland.com/
2 A case in which the unknown parameter is the market size of a country is analyzed in Sawaki (2015).
3 In Haufler and Wooton (2010), countries a and b have n and 1 – n consumers, respectively, and each 
consumer has an inverse demand of the form  pi= α – βxi. In the current paper, n is set to 1/2. In addition, the 
unit of the good is normalized so that  β = 1 to lessen the burden of calculations.
4 This is known as a “no-signaling-what-you-do-not-know” condition, typically assumed in signaling games 
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(see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p. 332). Without this condition, it is possible that the set of equilibria may 
expand.
5 Because this is a maximization problem for a single ﬁrm, it should be noted that ka xaa in πaa be decomposed 
into xaa + (ka–1)xaa and the derivative taken with respect to the ﬁrst term.
6 Similar calculations, albeit in a different setup, are found for instance in Collie and Hviid (1993, p. 330).
7 If information were complete, the proﬁts would become those in (13) with  ω̑ replaced by ω. Noting footnote 
3 and Assumption 1, and setting  ω̑= ω = 0 , it is straightforward to verify that these proﬁts are equivalent to 
the ﬁrst terms of (9) in Hauﬂer and Wooton (2010) with ω = 0 , β = 1, and n = 1/2.
8 Assumption 3 is a necessary, not sufﬁcient, condition for ensuring interior solutions. If  ω̑ = ω ≠ 0 , then 
tighter conditions are required to ensure x*ab, x*ba > 0. In addition, ka and kb, which are to be determined 
below, must be positive.
9 For two interpretations for this treatment, see footnote 11 in Hauﬂer and Wooton (2010, p. 242).
10 This type of differential equation is found in many signaling models (e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks, 2000, p. 
10).
11 The key is that the denominator of ∂ k*a ( ω̑) /∂ ω̑ neither reaches zero nor switches its sign for any value of  ω̑.
